PROTECTING WOMEN’S VOICES:
PREVENTING RETALIATORY DEFAMATION
CLAIMS IN THE #METOO CONTEXT
NICOLE LIGON†
As part of a personal commitment to positively utilize my
legal skills, I joined the Legal Network for Gender Equity,1 a
group of attorneys who support individuals seeking to come
forward about their experiences with sexual harassment and
assault. Through this network, I regularly counsel women who
want to share their stories but are concerned that by doing so,
they may open themselves up to costly defamation suits from
their aggressors. Their concerns are not so much rooted in any
notion that their stories are or could actually be defamatory.
Instead, these concerns often stem from a recognition that the
legal system in many ways benefits those with greater
resources—frequently the aggressors in these actions—and a
sensible concern that defending oneself in a legal action could be
burdensome on both financial and emotional levels even if the
complaint were ultimately dismissed.2
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Clinical Professor of Law and Supervising Attorney and of the First
Amendment Clinic at Duke University School of Law. Thank you to St. John’s Law
Review for the opportunity to participate in its Fall 2020 Symposium and
corresponding issue.
1
The Legal Network for Gender Equity is a project of the National Women’s
Law Center. See Legal Network for Gender Equity, NAT’L WOMEN’S L. CTR.,
https://nwlc.org/about/nwlc-legal-network/
[https://perma.cc/8GX2-MDLB]
(last
visited July 2, 2021).
2
Retaliatory lawsuits in the #MeToo context are, unfortunately, all too common.
See Madison Pauly, She Said, He Sued, MOTHER JONES (Mar./Apr. 2020),
https://www.motherjones.com/crime-justice/2020/02/metoo-me-too-defamation-libelaccuser-sexual-assault/ [https://perma.cc/2BC5-8PN4]; Kara Fox & Antoine Crouin,
Men Are Suing Women Who Accused Them of Harassment. Will It Stop Others from
Speaking Out?, CNN, https://www.cnn.com/2019/06/05/europe/metoo-defamationtrials-sandra-muller-france-intl/index.html
[https://perma.cc/K6G6-9PY3]
(last
updated June 5, 2019, 4:24 PM); Sui-Lee Wee & Li Yuan, They Said #MeToo. Now
They
Are
Being
Sued.,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Dec.
26,
2019),
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/12/26/business/china-sexual-harassment-metoo.html
[https://perma.cc/69WS-MB8M].
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My clients regularly come to me hoping that I may be able to
allay their fears about how defamation cases are treated by our
legal system, or at least help them engage in a risk assessment
before they step forward.
Some of my most difficult
conversations in counseling these individuals, however, involve
explaining that there is often not an easy and quick exit from a
defamation lawsuit. Their inclination that the legal system is
not set up with First Amendment rights in mind is correct: rules
governing legal processes are designed to give plaintiffs their day
in court against potential accusers. Naturally, “day” is just a
euphemism here; defamation cases frequently take months, if not
years, to resolve.3
As a First Amendment advocate and legal advisor, I see it as
my duty to help my clients participate in the national dialogue
surrounding the prevalence of sexual harassment and assault in
the safest way possible. For instance, where appropriate, I will
sometimes counsel clients to remove identifying descriptors of
assailants or specific employers to the extent that naming them
is not central to the story they wish to tell. My doing so has
nothing to do with a concern for the aggressors or wrongdoers,
but solely because I wish to spare my clients from being on the
receiving end of an expensive and draining defamation suit.
Indeed, industry experts have estimated that news publishers
typically spend $500,000 on average to get defamation suits
dismissed,4 meaning that the sheer financial burden on a
defendant can be steep.
Part of the reason why these suits are so costly is the way in
which the tort of defamation is structured. As a general rule,
defamation liability requires a plaintiff to show that the
defendant made an unprivileged and false statement concerning
the plaintiff to a third party, with a requisite level of intent, and
that the statement caused the plaintiff to suffer some harm.5
Some of these elements are frequently taken as givens: unless
the plaintiff gave permission for the utterance of a statement, for
3
See Thomas A. Waldman, SLAPP Suits: Weaknesses in First Amendment Law
and in the Courts’ Responses to Frivolous Litigation, 39 UCLA L. REV. 979, 1016
(1992).
4
See Kelly McBride, McClatchy Could Hire 10 Reporters for the Money It Will
Spend to Get Devin Nunes Lawsuit Dismissed, POYNTER (Apr. 11, 2019),
https://www.poynter.org/ethics-trust/2019/mcclatchy-could-hire-10-reporters-for-themoney-it-will-spend-to-get-devin-nunes-lawsuit-dismissed [https://perma.cc/TKY3AP88].
5
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 558 (AM. L. INST. 1977).
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instance, it is deemed unprivileged.6 And removing the name of
or other identifying information about an assailant could, for
example, spare one from a defamation suit because it may not be
obvious to a reader that the “concerning [the plaintiff]”
requirement is met.7 But most of the other elements of this tort
require serious factual investigation and analysis.
Take, for example, the requirement that a defamatory
statement be “false.”8 As a matter of law, an opinion generally
cannot be false,9 and thus cannot support a defamation action.
Consequently, parties in defamation suits frequently litigate
whether commentary regarding the plaintiff constitutes opinion
or fact. For example, if a survivor accused their alleged harasser
of being a “sexual predator,” questions might arise relating to
whether this terminology is a factual accusation. On the one
hand, a plaintiff may point to a dictionary definition—take
Merriam-Webster’s, which defines a “sexual predator” as
someone who has “committed a sexually violent offense and
especially one who is likely to commit more sexual offenses.”10
An accusation that someone has committed a crime will likely be
read as a defamatory per se statement, and to the extent the
dictionary definition supports this reading, the plaintiff may be
able to make out a successful case for defamation.11 However, a
defendant may instead point to numerous court opinions finding
that the terms “predator” and “predatory” have been construed as
hyperbolic opinions in other cases and contexts.12
6

Id. § 10.
Id. § 558.
8
Id.
9
See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 339–40 (1974).
10
Sexual Predator, MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2003).
11
See Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 765 n.1
(1985) (White, J., concurring) (“At the common law, slander, unlike libel, was
actionable per se only when it dealt with a narrow range of statements: those
imputing a criminal offense, a venereal or loathsome and communicable disease,
improper conduct of a lawful business, or unchastity of a woman.”). Courts continue
to identify criminal accusations as defamatory per se. See In re Lipsky, 460 S.W.3d
579, 596 (Tex. 2015).
12
See Dossett v. Ho-Chunk, Inc., No. 19-CV-01386, 2020 WL 3977609, at *9–10
(D. Or. July 14, 2020) (finding that a statement suggesting that someone engaged in
“predatory behavior” in the context of a sexual harassment dispute constituted a
statement of opinion entitled to First Amendment protection); Tagliaferri v. Szulik,
No. 15-Civ-2685, 2016 WL 3023327, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. May 25, 2016) (“Use of colorful
language such as ‘predator,’ ‘victimized,’ or ‘face of evil’ are not actionable in and of
themselves. . . . In this case, the term[ ] ‘predator’ . . . do[es] not, without external
context, amount to accusations that Plaintiff engaged in specific unlawful
behavior.”).
7
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Similarly, the intent element of a defamation tort leaves
much room for parties to dispute. The plaintiff’s burden with
regard to proving the intent element varies based on how wellknown the plaintiff is, but the general rule is that if a plaintiff is
a public figure, he must show that the defendant made her
statement with “actual malice,” and if he is a private figure, he
must show that the defendant made her statement with
“common law malice.”13 This invariably leads to a separate
dispute regarding whether the plaintiff is a public figure or
private figure,14 because it is much more difficult for a plaintiff to
show that a defendant acted with actual, as opposed to common
law, malice. Indeed, actual malice requires the plaintiff to show
that a speaker made her statement with actual knowledge that it
was false or with reckless disregard as to its truth.15 Conversely,
common law malice simply requires the plaintiff to show that a
speaker made her statement with an “ill will” towards the
plaintiff or with a reckless and conscious indifference toward the
plaintiff’s rights.16 Some courts are seemingly reluctant to delve
into either the question of the plaintiff’s public figure status or
the speaker’s state of mind—to the extent the parties disagree—
at the motion to dismiss stage.17 This means that unless the
13

Gertz, 418 U.S. at 333–34, 344–46.
See, e.g., Elliott v. Donegan, 469 F. Supp. 3d 40, 48–49 (E.D.N.Y. 2020). A
plaintiff is a general-purpose public figure if he “enjoy[s] significantly greater access
to the channels of effective communication and hence ha[s] a more realistic
opportunity to counteract false statements than private individuals normally enjoy”
and he has “assumed roles of especial prominence in the affairs of
society . . . invit[ing] attention and comment.” Gertz, 418 U.S. at 344–45. A plaintiff
is a limited-purpose public figure if he (1) has “access to channels of effective
communication”; (2) “voluntarily assumed a role of special prominence in a public
controversy”; (3) “sought to influence the resolution or outcome of the
controversy”; (4) “the controversy existed prior to the publication of the defamatory
statements”; and (5) he “retained public figure status at the time of the alleged
defamation.” Fitzgerald v. Penthouse Int’l, Ltd., 691 F.2d 666, 668 (4th Cir. 1982).
The Fitzgerald test tracks the two Gertz factors, with the first Fitzgerald
requirement being the same as the first Gertz factor, the second and third Fitzgerald
requirements corresponding to the normative Gertz factor, and the fourth and fifth
Fitzgerald requirements reflecting unstated but necessary technical considerations.
See Foretich v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 37 F.3d 1541, 1553 (4th Cir. 1994); Reuber
v. Food Chem. News, Inc., 925 F.2d 703, 708–09 (4th Cir. 1991).
15
N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279–80 (1964).
16
Hainer v. Am. Med. Int’l, Inc., 492 S.E.2d 103, 107 (S.C. 1997).
17
See, e.g., McGlothlin v. Hennelly, 370 F.Supp.3d 603, 617 (D.S.C. 2019)
(holding that resolving the public figure question is “more appropriate for a
summary judgment motion after discovery has been conducted”); Trivedi v.
Slawecki, No. 11-CV-02390, 2012 WL 5987410, at *3 (M.D. Pa. Nov. 28, 2012);
Rosanova v. Playboy Enter.’s, Inc., 580 F.2d 859, 862 (5th Cir. 1978); Isuzu Motors
14
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plaintiff agrees that the intent element is not met, defendants
may be unlikely to win a dispositive motion to dismiss the case at
this stage on the basis of this element.
When factual disputes occur and a defendant cannot—in the
eyes of the court—conclusively disprove all elements of the
defamation tort on the basis of a complaint, cases will not be
disposed of at a motion to dismiss stage. This means that
survivors are often forced to endure lengthy and costly discovery.
Discovery can entail a number of personal and invasive requests,
including requiring the survivor to sit for a deposition during
which she will be interrogated about matters relevant to the
case, having the survivor answer questions relating to the case in
writing via interrogatories and requests for admission, and
obligating the survivor to sift through all documentation she has
that is relevant to the case and to compile and share that
information with her assailant’s counsel.
The expense in
undergoing discovery can be steep for a defendant in this type of
action—not only on a financial level but also an emotional one.
Even if, after going through discovery, the survivor wins
dismissal on the basis of summary judgment or following a trial,
she will have already suffered a great deal of irreversible costs.
Indeed, attorney’s fees mount exponentially during the discovery
process.18 And even where a defendant wins dismissal of a
defamation suit, there is not always a guarantee that she will be
able to recover the money spent to defend herself against a
frivolous defamation claim in many jurisdictions.19 In other
words, some courts give well-resourced plaintiffs the ability to
utilize the court system to deliver a silencing blow to women
seeking to come forward by forcing them to defend themselves in
Ltd. v. Consumers Union of U.S., Inc., 12 F.Supp.2d 1035, 1044 n.1 (C.D.Cal. 1998);
but see Chapin v. Knight-Ridder, Inc., 993 F.2d 1087, 1092 n.4 (4th Cir. 1993)
(noting that the “district court’s caution” in not deciding whether the plaintiff was a
public figure at the motion to dismiss stage was “unnecessary” because the
“plaintiffs’ status as ‘public figures’ [was] irretractably admitted on the face of the
complaint.”); Freedlander v. Edens Broad., Inc., 734 F.Supp 221, 224 (E.D. Va. 1990)
(holding, at the motion to dismiss stage, that plaintiffs were public figures).
18
The Garment Workers Ctr. v. Superior Court, 117 Cal. App. 4th 1156, 1161
(2004) (recognizing that “discovery is usually the most time-consuming and
expensive aspect of pretrial litigation”).
19
See A Small Newspaper in Iowa Wins a Libel Suit, but Legal Costs May Force
It
to
Close,
FIRST
AMEND.
WATCH
(Oct.
10,
2019),
https://firstamendmentwatch.org/a-small-newspaper-in-iowa-wins-a-libel-suit-butlegal-costs-may-force-it-to-close [https://perma.cc/SSH4-6KKJ] (noting that a newspaper who successfully defended itself against a frivolous libel action fell to the
brink of closure due to $140,000 in legal costs).
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costly, albeit it ultimately unsuccessful, lawsuits. This can lead
to a dearth of survivors willing to come forward to openly speak
on their experiences, during a time when sexual assault and
harassment is already severely underreported.20
But the situation is brighter in jurisdictions with robust
anti-SLAPP laws. Anti-SLAPP laws take aim at strategic
lawsuits against public participation or, as they are commonly
known, “SLAPP” suits.21 SLAPP suits are commonly defined as
“lawsuit[s] designed to shut down a person’s right to participate
in public discourse through a lawsuit that the plaintiff has filed
not because he thinks he can win, but to intimidate or punish
someone else.”22 In other words, SLAPP suits are brought not to
compensate a wrongfully injured person or company, but rather
to discourage the defendants and others from exercising their
First Amendment rights. Retaliatory defamation suits brought

20
See
The
Criminal
Justice
System:
Statistics,
RAINN,
https://www.rainn.org/statistics/criminal-justice-system (last visited July 2, 2021)
[https://perma.cc/T8YQ-GJSG] (noting that only about 23% of sexual assaults are
reported to police).
21
Lawsuit Denied Concerning Bishop Tube Site, DAILY LOC. NEWS (Sept. 7,
2018), https://www.dailylocal.com/news/local/lawsuit-denied-concerning-bishop-tubesite/article_92eda182-b2d7-11e8-8ec9-e7c2b71b1f9e.html (“The original SLAPP
action was filed by O’Neill . . . in the Court of Common Pleas in Chester County and
claimed the advocacy activities of van Rossum and the Delaware Riverkeeper
Network resulted in defamation/commercial disparagement, interference with
contractual or business relations and amounted to a civil conspiracy.”) (emphasis
added); Jon Hurdle, Judge Throws Out Developer’s ‘SLAPP Suit’ Against
Environmental Group, 90.5 WESA (Aug. 23, 2017), https://www.wesa.fm/post/judgethrows-out-developers-slapp-suit-against-environmental-group#stream/0
[https://perma.cc/E235-SCEE] (“The ruling supports DRN’s contention that O’Neill’s
challenge, filed on June 27, was a so-called ‘SLAPP’ suit—a legal acronym standing
for ‘Strategic Lawsuit Against Public Participation’—an attempt to block its freespeech rights.”); James Tager, SLAPPs: The Greatest Free Expression Threat You’ve
Never Heard Of?, PEN AM. (Oct. 30, 2017), https://pen.org/slapps-free-expressionthreat/ [https://perma.cc/3W3F-YMY6] (characterizing the O’Neil lawsuit as a
SLAPP lawsuit); David E. Hess, Chester County Judge Issues Opinion Reaffirming
Decision To Dismiss SLAPP Suit Against Environmental Group, PA ENV’T DIG. (Oct.
24,
2017),
http://www.paenvironmentdigest.com/newsletter/default.asp?NewsletterArticleID=4
1406[https://perma.cc/9TMN-FYR2]; see also Darcy Reddan, Pa. Developer Says
Defamation Ruling At Odds With Prior Suit, LAW360 (Sept. 21, 2018, 5:53 PM),
https://www.law360.com/articles/1085095/pa-developer-says-defamation-ruling-atodds-with-prior-suit (DRN’s attorney Mark Freed explaining that future appeals in
this action are “particularly troubling given [the] trial court’s finding that [the
developer] ‘by all accounts, is simply using this lawsuit to chill free speech and
harass those’ who oppose his project.”). The author’s opinion on this categorization of
this case is based on her research, which has been disclosed throughout this piece.
22
Tager, supra note 21.
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against women who wish to speak out about their experiences
with sexual assault or harassment are examples of SLAPP
suits.23
While approximately thirty states currently have antiSLAPP laws, these statutes vary in strength and levels of
protection for defendants.24 One way to help ensure that women
are able to come forward with their experiences and speak
candidly without undue fear of a costly defamation suit is to
encourage the widespread enactment of strong anti-SLAPP laws.
California’s anti-SLAPP statute is often considered to be an
exemplary guide for protecting defendants from frivolous and
time-consuming defamation claims.
California’s anti-SLAPP statute, California Civil Procedure
Code § 425.16, enables defendants to quickly move to strike a
complaint after it has been filed so that the case may be disposed
of before the parties endure lengthy pretrial practice.25 Once a
defendant moves to strike the complaint under California’s
statute, the court will automatically stay discovery until the
court has ruled on the motion.26 To successfully strike a
complaint, the motion must demonstrate that the defendant is
being sued for a protected activity: speaking openly and freely “in
California courts have
connection with a public issue.”27
consistently construed this “public issue” language broadly,28
making the statute widely applicable to speech on many issues.29
For example, a California state court dismissed a case against

23

Id.
State Anti-SLAPP Laws, PUB. PARTICIPATION PROJECT, https://antislapp.org/your-states-free-speech-protection/ [https://perma.cc/E9NA-VDFY] (last
visited Feb. 27, 2021).
25
CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 425.16(b)(1) (West 2015).
26
Id. § 425.16(g).
27
Id. § 425.16(b)(1) & (e).
28
Briggs v. Eden Council for Hope & Opportunity, 969 P.2d 564, 573–74 (Cal.
1999); Jarrow Formulas, Inc. v. LaMarche, 74 P.3d 737, 742 (Cal. 2003) (“In addition
to honoring the anti-SLAPP statute’s plain language, the Court of Appeal’s
construction adheres to the express statutory command that ‘this section shall be
construed broadly.’ ”); Club Members for an Honest Election v. Sierra Club, 196 P.3d
1094, 1099 (Cal. 2008) (“The Legislature has also directed that section 425.16 ‘shall
be construed broadly’ given that the anti-SLAPP statute protects speech about
important public issues.”).
29
“Although the [California] [l]egislature originally enacted [the anti-SLAPP
statute] to address the ‘paradigm SLAPP suit’ of a defamation lawsuit filed by a
large developer against environmental activists, the anti-SLAPP statute is not
limited to this typical scenario.” THOMAS R. BURKE, ANTI-SLAPP LITIGATION § 2:5
(listing cases that go beyond the paradigm anti-SLAPP scenarios).
24
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the creators of the film Borat because the plaintiffs appeared in
the movie drinking alcohol and making racist and sexist
remarks; the court found that those citizens’ racist and sexist
views were “issues of public interest.”30 It thus follows that
commentary related to inappropriate sexual conduct likely
constitutes speech on “public issues” under California’s statute.
Once a movant under California’s anti-SLAPP law has
shown that the plaintiff’s cause of action arises from the
defendant’s speech on a public issue, the burden completely shifts
to the plaintiff.31 The court will then strike the cause of action
unless the plaintiff can produce admissible evidence that
establishes a probability of success on the merits.32 And if a
defendant wins an anti-SLAPP motion to strike, California will
automatically award the defendant the reasonable costs and
attorney’s fees accumulated in the course of the action, which the
plaintiff frequently covers.33 This mandate is critical because it
makes it so a well-resourced plaintiff is less likely to be able to
financially “punish” a defendant for speaking out about her
experience.34
The fact that not all jurisdictions have anti-SLAPP
protections means that some survivors will face more risk in
speaking out about their experiences than others. Indeed,
because California’s anti-SLAPP law provides defendants with
numerous strong protections, even well-resourced plaintiffs are
forced to think twice before bringing a meritless defamation suit

30
See Doe v. One Am. Prod., Case No. SC091723, at *5 (Ca. Super. Ct. Feb. 15,
2007); Complaint for Plaintiff at 2, Doe v. One Am. Prod., Case No. SC091723, at *5
(Ca. Super. Ct. 2007).
31
Simpson Strong-Tie Co., Inc. v. Gore, 230 P.3d 1117, 1123 (Cal. 2010).
32
Id.
33
See Wanland v. Law Offices of Mastagni, Holstedt & Chiurazzi, 141 Cal. App.
4th 15, 22 (Cal. Ct. App. 2006) (“[T]he full protection of a defendant’s rights requires
an award of attorney fees for litigating the adequacy of the plaintiff’s undertaking.”);
Lin v. City of Pleasanton, 176 Cal. App. 4th 408, 413 (Cal. Ct. App. 2009), as
modified on denial of reh’g (Aug. 11, 2009) (recognizing defendant’s ability to
recovery attorney’s fees under CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 425.16 even where a
demurrer was granted). See e.g., Wynn v. Chanos, No. 14–cv–04329, 2015 WL
3832561, at *6 (N.D. Cal. June 19, 2015), aff’d, 685 F. App’x 578 (9th Cir. 2017)
(awarding $390,149.63 in fees and $32,231.23 in costs); Metabolife Int’l, Inc. v.
Wornick, 213 F. Supp. 2d 1220, 1228 (S.D. Cal. 2002) (awarding $318,687.99 in
attorney’s fees and costs); Vargas v. City of Salinas, 200 Cal. App. 4th 1331, 1338
(2011) (affirming award of $226,928 in fees and $2,495.84 in costs).
34
Because discovery is also stayed under the statute, plaintiffs likewise are less
able to inflict emotional damage onto defendants as well, since the defendant can be
spared forced depositions and other discovery obligations.
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there. But in the jurisdictions that do not have anti-SLAPP
statutes,35 or otherwise have weaker protections,36 survivors
wishing to speak out about their experiences remain more
vulnerable and face greater risks.
To better ensure more accurate reporting and highlighting of
women’s experiences with sexual harassment and sexual assault,
it is critical for more states to adopt strong protections for
defendants in defamation cases. Until this happens, women will
continue to face the difficult choice of whether to risk exposure to
a defamation lawsuit aimed solely at silencing their truths in
order to speak about their experiences. While attorneys, such as
those who partake in the Legal Network for Gender Equity, can
sometimes help to shield these individuals from viable
defamation claims on a case-by-case basis, legislative reform in
this area would better and more broadly ensure that these
important stories can be heard while limiting potential exposure
from frivolous lawsuits brought by well-resourced wrongdoers.
Now is the time for states to consider enacting these protections
to help protect women’s voices, especially in the space of sexual
assault and sexual harassment.

35
At the time of publication, these states include Alabama, Alaska, Idaho, Iowa,
Kentucky, Michigan, Mississippi, Montana, New Hampshire, New Jersey, North
Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, South Carolina, South Dakota, West Virginia,
Wisconsin, Wyoming. See State Anti-SLAPP Laws, supra note 24.
36
For example, anti-SLAPP laws in certain states are too narrow to effectively
protect defendants whose speech is significant and on general matters of public
concern. Prior to being amended in November 2020, New York’s statute, for
instance, only applied where speech by the defendant concerned the plaintiff’s
application to a “government body” for “a permit, zoning change, lease, license,
certificate or other entitlement for use or permission to act.” Civil Rights Law, ch.
767, § 3, 1992 N.Y. Laws 3970, (current version at N.Y. CIV. RIGHTS LAW § 76-a
(McKinney 2020)). And Virginia’s statute, for instance, merely permits and does not
mandate payment of reasonable attorney fees and costs to a successful anti-SLAPP
movant. See VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-223.2(B).

